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Abstract 
 
 
This paper provides cross-country evidence that variations in bank regulatory policies 
result in differences in income distribution. In particular, market discipline (private 
monitoring) and activity restrictions have an unambiguously positive and significant 
effect on income inequality and poverty, and this effect holds regardless of the level 
of economic and institutional development. In contrast, more stringent bank capital 
regulation and enhanced official supervisory power tend to reduce income inequality. 
However, this latter effect fades away for countries with low levels of economic and 
institutional development. We contend that these findings have new implications for 
the effects of bank regulations besides those related to their impact on financial 
stability.  
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1. Introduction 
 
 Andrei Shleifer (2009) is probably right in that the liberalization policies over the last 
three decades have left the world with higher incomes, longer average life spans, higher-
quality education, and technological advances. Yet, the recent financial crisis reminds us of a 
debate that goes back to Adam Smith, David Ricardo, and Karl Marx regarding who 
economic downturns hurt, naturally linking recession with income inequality and issues of 
economic convergence (Evans, 1998). In particular, this crisis has taken a heavy toll on the 
banking sector and spread quickly to the real economy on a global basis. Free markets 
unambiguously failed to safeguard themselves and the economy, but so did regulatory 
policies aiming to provide a safety net for lenders, borrowers, and depositors. It may be too 
soon to examine who this crisis primarily hurt; however, it may be worth establishing a nexus 
between banking regulatory policies and income inequality. This paper is, to our knowledge, 
the first to assess the impact of specific bank regulatory policies on income inequality at a 
cross-country level.  
 The present study is primarily motivated by the extensive literature on the 
relationship between finance and the distribution of income. Demirgüç-Kunt and Levine 
(2009) offer a thorough review of this literature, and the main argument is that improvements 
in financial markets, contracts, and intermediaries tend to reduce income inequality. That is, 
financial imperfections, such as information and transaction costs, may be especially binding 
on the poor who lack collateral and credit history (Beck et al., 2007). Furthermore, Galor and 
Moav (2004) suggest that failing to liberalize the banking sector probably leads to local 
monopolies, a situation that most likely hurts the poor.  
 Contradicting the potential negative relationship between financial liberalization and 
inequality are earlier important contributions, such as Greenwood and Jovanovic (1990), who 
suggest that banks with a profit-maximizing behavior tend to lend to richer firms and 
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households and avoid lending to individuals with low levels of collateral, thus further 
increasing inequality. Yet, the full spectrum of the literature on the finance-inequality 
relationship does not explicitly account for the dynamic nature of policies related to the 
banking sector and considers the regulatory environment fixed. Phrased differently, the 
literature does not give special attention to the specific features of banking regulations in 
different countries and their evolution as a source of income inequality. Notably, the review 
of Demirgüç-Kunt and Levine (2009) emphasizes that researchers have not thoroughly 
examined the impact of policy initiatives, such as bank regulations and securities law, on 
income inequality.  
  Beck et al. (2010) and Barth et al. (2008) further motivate this study. The former 
study, which is closer to our goals, assesses the impact of U.S. bank deregulation of the 
1970s to the 1990s on the distribution of income and finds that deregulation significantly 
reduces inequality by boosting incomes in the lower part of the income distribution but has 
little impact on incomes above the median. This is first-hand evidence that bank regulatory 
policies may have a central role in shaping the distribution of income.  
 Barth et al. (2008) update their 2001 database on bank regulations and show that 
differences in bank regulations among countries and over time are notable. This holds despite 
the Basel Committee's recent initiatives to harmonize and benchmark regulatory frameworks. 
Certainly, the main goal of bank regulatory policies is to make banking and financial systems 
more efficient and stable; however, they also may have strong implications for the 
macroeconomic environment. Given all of this, a study that assesses the impact of cross-
country and timely variations in bank regulations on income inequality is worthwhile and 
feasible. 
Last but not least, the analysis of the relationship between bank regulations and 
income inequality is stimulated by the debate on the impact of regulatory initiatives in other 
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industries on the distribution of income. Fortin and Lemieux (1997), for example, show that 
changes in institutions and deregulation of various industries have a significant effect on 
wage inequality. In a similar vein, Calderón and Chong (2009) focus on how labor-market 
institutions affect inequality. Additionally, Quinn and Inclán (1997) suggest that the presence 
of financial and other restrictions influence the relative prices of the inputs of production. If 
the restrictions limit the ability of highly skilled domestic workers in a particular sector to 
offer their services to foreign would-be investors, workers’ skills and education in that sector 
diminish, as do their wages. Similar channels may be at work in a potential relationship 
between bank regulations and the distribution of income. For example, activity restrictions on 
banks may generate more fragmented markets, and borrowers’ and investors’ costs may rise, 
rendering the marginal cost of borrowing higher, especially for the poor. 
Based on these considerations, we place the spotlight on the effects banking 
regulations may have on the distribution of income of different countries. More specifically, 
this paper examines empirically whether specific forms of national banking regulation affect 
income inequality and poverty. The comprehensive database on bank regulatory policies 
developed by Barth et al. (2001, 2006, 2008)—who group regulations into four major indices 
pertaining to capital regulation (requirements), official supervisory power, private monitoring 
(market discipline), and activity restrictions on banks—make this study possible. We trace 
the impact of these indices on income inequality and poverty for 116 countries over 1998–
2007. As an additional analysis, we examine whether the effect of banking regulation varies 
with countries' economic/institutional development.  
The major empirical findings are that market discipline and activity restrictions have 
an unambiguously positive and significant effect on income inequality and poverty, and this 
effect holds regardless of the level of economic and institutional development. Given that 
these regulations aim at containing the risk-taking appetite of banks and reducing systemic 
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risk, it becomes apparent that a policy trade-off between short-term, financial-stability 
enhancement and longer-term equality exists. In contrast, more stringent bank capital 
requirements and enhanced official supervisory power tend to reduce income inequality and 
the percentage of people earning a very low income. However, this latter effect fades away 
for countries with low levels of economic and institutional development. Hence, we are once 
again reminded that institutional capacity and the initial level of economic development are 
prerequisites for regulations to have a constructive effect on the real economy (e.g., Laffont, 
2005, and references therein). 
The rest of this paper is structured as follows: Section 2 describes the data set in the 
empirical analysis and evaluates the potential impact of specific types of bank regulation on 
income inequality. Section 3 discusses the econometric methodology and presents the 
empirical results. Section 4 offers some policy implications and concludes the paper.    
 
2. Data description 
To examine the impact of different forms of regulation on income inequality and poverty in 
the international setting, we collect country-level data. The final sample includes data from 
116 countries for which information on bank regulations is available over the period 1998–
2007. We use five-year averages for three reasons. First, annual macroeconomic data are 
noisy (Roine et al., 2009); second, although most of the variables have yearly observations, 
the data on income inequality variables are more limited; third, the regulatory conditions do 
not change on a yearly basis, nor are they likely to exert an impact on income inequality in 
the very short term. However, we verify that our main results hold when we use three- or 10-
year time spans.  
 The rest of this section describes the variables in the empirical analysis and their 
sources and provides a theoretical discussion on why a relationship between regulations and 
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inequality may exist. Table 1 offers summary statistics, and Table 2 pair-wise correlations 
between the explanatory variables.  
 
[INSERT TABLES 1 AND 2] 
 
2.1. Income Inequality  
The dependent variables used to proxy inequality are the Gini coefficient and the income 
share of people in the lower 10% or 20% of the income distribution (i.e., "the poor"). Data 
for both variables are from the United Nations University World Institute for Development 
Economics Research (UNU-WIDER) World Income Inequality Database (WIID).1 The Gini 
coefficient is derived from the Lorenz curve and ranges between 0 and 1. A low Gini 
indicates a more equal distribution, with 0 corresponding to perfect equality; a higher Gini 
indicates more unequal distribution, with 1 corresponding to perfect inequality. The Gini 
coefficient is the most widely used measure of inequality in the relevant empirical literature 
(e.g., Beck et al., 2007; Dollar and Kraay, 2002). The average value in our data set is 39.62.  
Countries such as Brazil, Bolivia, and South Africa obtain very high values, and the Czech 
Republic, Slovenia, Australia, and the Scandinavian countries exhibit low inequality.  
 Economic policy, and thus regulations, may affect disproportionately the poor and 
the rich, or they may affect both groups in such a way that the total income distribution is 
unaffected. Because we are also interested in examining the impact of bank regulations on 
poverty, we use information on low income earners and, in particular, on people in the lowest 
income decile of the income distribution. Alternatively, we also experiment with data on the 
                                                 
1 Following the directions of the WIID database, we use “household” as the income-sharing unit and “person” 
as the unit of analysis. The Gini coefficient is based on disposable income. We have verified that our estimation 
results are sufficiently robust for the use of the Gini coefficient reported in the World Bank’s World 
Development Indicators. Unfortunately, with this index we lose about 30 observations. Another excellent index 
of inequality is from the University of Texas Inequality Project; however, data on this indicator are available 
only up to 2002.  
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lowest 20% or 25% of the income distribution. Countries in our sample with substantial 
shares of population in the lower decile of the income distribution are the Latin American 
countries and South Africa. The Scandinavian countries are at the opposite end, with low 
shares of population in the lower decile of the income distribution.  
 
2.2. Bank Regulations and Their Potential Impact on Income Inequality 
Barth et al. (2001, 2006, 2008) thoroughly describe the regulatory conditions characterizing 
the banking industries of a large number of countries and offer four general indices of bank 
regulation (pertaining to capital regulation, official supervisory power, private monitoring, 
and activity restrictions on banks), which serve as the main explanatory variables of our 
study. Below we discuss the regulatory indices in some detail; the Appendix provides explicit 
information on their construction.  
The capital-regulation (or capital-requirements) index shows the extent of both initial 
and overall capital stringency. Initial capital stringency refers to whether funds considered 
regulatory capital can include assets other than cash or government securities and borrowed 
funds, as well as whether the regulatory or supervisory authorities verify these sources. 
Differently phrased, overall capital stringency indicates whether banks and regulators 
consider risk elements and value losses when calculating regulatory capital. Theoretically, 
the capital-requirements index can take values between 0 and 8, with higher values indicating 
more stringent capital requirements. In this study, it ranges between 1.6 and 8. More stringent 
capital requirements usually aim at reducing systemic risk and buffering the economy from 
potential financial crises stemming from this risk. If crises hurt primarily the poor, and 
assuming that capital regulation succeeds in lowering systemic risk, then capital regulation 
should therefore lower income inequality.  
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Moreover, Repullo and Suarez (2008, 2009) highlight the procyclical effect of bank 
capital regulation in general and of Basel II in particular. Given that the majority of the 
literature on the relationship between income inequality and the business cycle seems to 
agree that a negative correlation exists between the two (Barlevy and Tsiddon, 2006), then a 
negative correlation is also expected between capital regulation and inequality. In contrast, 
based on the fact that capital requirements hold in both good and bad times and that capital is 
expensive, more stringent capital requirements may therefore raise banks’ incentives to lend 
to "safer" individuals and firms and avoid lending to relatively poor individuals, even if they 
are creditworthy or will generate income with the capital. This would be especially true when 
the financial system and the economy are “anxious” (Fostel and Geanakoplos, 2008). 
The supervisory power index reveals the power of the supervisory agencies to take 
specific actions, in relation to their authority, on bank managers, directors, shareholders, and 
auditors. This index has a maximum value of 14 and a minimum value of 0, with higher 
values indicating more powerful supervisors. In our data set, the supervisory power index 
ranges between 5 and 14. Official supervisory power corresponds to the second pillar of 
Basel II and reflects the ability of supervisors to enforce regulatory changes.  
To this end, we expect that superior ability to enforce the regulatory initiatives of the 
other two pillars of Basel II would improve financial intermediation services and the 
screening and monitoring of projects. This, in turn, would allow banks to fund good 
investment ideas from individuals across the full spectrum of the income distribution, 
yielding a narrower income distribution and lower inequality (Beck et al., 2007). The same 
outcome will prevail if enhanced supervisory power guarantees a more competitive and 
efficient banking sector. That is, a bank's market power is usually associated with 
relationship lending and higher interest-rate margins, and both elements constitute barriers 
for individuals and firms with less collateral or poor credit. Therefore, if anything, we expect 
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the relationship between enhanced supervisory power and income inequality to be negative. 
Note, however, the implicit assumption so far that the laws giving supervisors power can be 
offset if public institutions are weak (e.g., government corruption is high or bureaucratic 
quality is low) and/or economic development has not reached an appropriate level; 
apparently, this is the case for developing countries that face higher absolute poverty.  
We also employ a private-monitoring or market-discipline index, which reflects (i) 
the degree to which banks must disclose accurate information to the public (e.g., disclosure 
of off-balance-sheet items, risk-management procedures, etc.) and (ii) whether incentives 
exist to increase market discipline with policies such as subordinated debt and deposit-
insurance schemes. In other words, this index measures the degree to which regulations 
empower, facilitate, and encourage the private sector to monitor banks. The index has a 
maximum value of 9 and a minimum value of 0, where higher values indicate more intense 
market discipline. 
Finally, the fourth regulatory index considers whether securities, insurance, real estate 
activities, and ownership of nonfinancial firms are unrestricted, permitted, restricted, or 
prohibited. Theoretically, the activity restrictions index can range between 1 and 4, where 
higher values indicate higher restrictions. In our sample, the index takes values between 1 
and 4, inclusive. 
The impact of market discipline and activity restrictions on the distribution of income 
can theoretically go both ways. On one hand, enhanced private incentives to monitor banks 
and lower restrictions on bank activities encourage competition in the banking sector, lower 
barriers to entry, and guarantee better screening and monitoring of lending projects. In line 
with the discussion of the potential impact of supervisory power on inequality, this would 
allow individuals at the lower end of the income distribution to have easier access to lending 
and capital and to fund their investment ideas more efficiently and at a lower cost.  
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On the other hand, especially during periods of anxiety, intense private monitoring 
would tend to put more stress on banks to deliver good financial results, and banks may find 
it optimal not to fund potentially good but relatively risky projects (Repullo and Suarez, 
2008). Intuitively, this implies that banks would make lending decisions on the basis of the 
ability to repay (i.e., availability of collateral) and not on the novelty and the potential of the 
investment project. In addition, looser activity restrictions on banks may lead to excess bank 
risk-taking, especially through a substantial increase in nontraditional activities, and a rise in 
the probability of bank failures. In particular, the recent crisis has shown that banks react to 
downturns by tightening their lending standards, which reduces lending to individuals with 
lower asset holdings and collateral. This would in fact widen the distribution of income. 
In brief, for most bank regulations, theoretical arguments in favor of both a positive 
and a negative relationship with income inequality exist. However, as noted in the case of 
supervisory power, regulation reflects law, and a prerequisite for its effectiveness is that it 
creates a minimum level of economic and institutional development (e.g., Laffont, 2005). 
Apparently, identifying which effects prevail becomes fundamentally an empirical issue.  
 
2.3. Control Variables 
The control variables are from the extensive literature on the determinants of income 
inequality (e.g., Roine et al., 2009; Beck et al., 2007). In particular, we control for a number 
of macroeconomic, institutional, demographic, and economic policy elements that may affect 
income inequality.  
 First, we control for the initial level of income inequality in each country, using the 
level of inequality (Gini or lower decile) observed in 1997 (e.g., Deinenger and Squire, 1996; 
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Li et al., 1998). We expect that initial inequality is positively related to the contemporary 
level of inequality.2  
 Second, we use GDP per capita to control for the level of economic development, the 
inflation rate to control for the monetary conditions, and the population size to control for the 
demographics in each country. Information for these variables is from the World 
Development Indicators (WDI).  
 Third, the presence of quality institutions will probably tend to lower inequality, even 
though strong endogenous effects may prevail in this relationship (Chong and Gradstein, 
2007). Also, quality institutions may enhance the impact of regulations on the distribution of 
income and weaker institutions may undermine it. To characterize the quality of institutions, 
we use the "Law and Order" and the "Bureaucratic Quality" indices of the International 
Country Risk Guide (ICRG).3 
 The literature's empirical findings concerning the impact of (i) trade openness, (ii) 
public policy, and (iii) general financial development on inequality are rather inconclusive. 
For example, trade openness increases income in standard Heckscher-Ohlin trade theory, but 
the extent to which it reduces inequality within countries remains questionable (Easterly, 
2005). Our measure for trade openness is the sum of exports and imports as a share of GDP, 
and data come from the Penn World Table (PWT).  
 In order to account for the activity and growth of government over the period 
examined, we include the ratio of central government expenditure as a share of GDP (data 
also taken from the PWT). Higher government spending may disproportionately help the 
poor if used efficiently, but in cases where institutions are weak (primarily in developing 
countries), higher government spending may be wasteful.  
                                                 
2 We also experiment with the level of inequality observed in 1990 and obtain similar results. 
3 We additionally employed variables pertaining to corruption in government, democratic accountability, 
property rights, etc. However, these tend to be highly correlated among themselves and with the GDP per 
Capita variable.  
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 Finally, to purify the relationship between bank regulations and inequality from 
elements pertaining to the characteristics of the financial environment, we use two relevant 
control variables. As a proxy for the level of liquidity, we use the ratio of bank deposits to 
bank credit; as a proxy for the mobility of banks across countries, we use the ratio of offshore 
bank deposits to domestic bank deposits (both from Beck and Demirgüç-Kunt, 2009). The 
higher the first ratio, the higher the level of bank liquidity. A higher liquidity ratio also 
indicates lower dependence on the banking sector in that country, which indicates higher 
financial depth, and thus we expect it to relate negatively to inequality. The second variable 
shows how easy it is to transfer deposits across the border, with higher values reflecting high 
mobility of funds, higher tax evasion, etc. We expect, therefore, the latter variable to be 
positively associated with inequality. 
 
3. Econometric Identification and Empirical Findings 
In this section, we present the main results of the study and conduct sensitivity analyses to 
assess (i) potential endogeneity of the regulatory variables, (ii) the impact of outliers, and (iii) 
whether using a three-year or 10-year time interval alters the findings.  
 
3.1. Bank Regulations and Income Inequality: Main Results  
Here we utilize panel data estimation methods that are suitable for panels with a large cross-
sectional dimension (116 countries) and a small time dimension (two five-year periods), thus 
excluding dynamic panel data methods at this stage (see also Roodman, 2009).4 The 
empirical strategy in this section rests on the assumption that the distribution of income does 
not affect cross-country regulatory conditions. Theoretically, this assumption seems valid 
because regulators in the banking industry are generally concerned with promoting financial 
                                                 
4 However, the sensitivity analysis uses dynamic panel data methods. 
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stability, making it unreasonable to assume that the distribution of income affects their 
decisions.5 Both bank regulations and income inequality may be endogenous to other 
country-specific characteristics, such as the macroeconomic and/or the institutional 
environment. Below we explore this prospect using an instrumental variables regression 
method. 
Panels with a large cross-sectional and small time dimension are usually prone to 
considerable heteroskedasticity, and a simple likelihood ratio test shows that our panel is no 
exception. Therefore, one may use ordinary least squares (OLS) with fixed effects or feasible 
generalized least squares (FGLS) with random effects, both corrected for heteroskedastic 
standard errors. However, the OLS fixed-effects estimator is likely to be problematic in our 
sample, because the regulation indices are many times constant for individual countries. 
Therefore, we favor the FGLS random-effects estimator (see also Roine et al., 2009) and we 
conduct sensitivity analyses using the OLS fixed-effects estimator proposed by Driscoll and 
Kraay (1998), which is suitable for panels with cross-sectional dependence.6 Finally, because 
the panel includes only two time periods, it is unlikely that temporal dependence or time-
specific autocorrelation are present, which we confirm using the Drukker (2003) test. We still 
include a time effect among the regressors.7  
The first set of empirical results is in Table 3, where the dependent variable is the 
Gini coefficient. The first regression (column 1) includes the four regulatory indices and the 
macroeconomic and demographic variables. The rest of the regressions are enhanced with 
other policy, institutional, and financial-structure variables. In the third regression we include 
the institutional variables (Bureaucratic quality and Law & order) and GDP per Capita in 
the same equation. However, due to the high correlation among these variables, the results 
                                                 
5 Beck et al. (2009) make the same assumption. A Durbin-Wu-Hausman endogeneity test also reveals that it is 
quite reasonable also in our sample (the p-value of the test is 0.55 with critical value 0.05). 
6 We also experiment with a differences-in-differences estimator, which yields similar results. In our context 
this approach has the disadvantage of having only two time periods available.  
7 The results are robust irrespective of whether time effect is included or excluded. 
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for the control variables are relatively inferior. The main results on the regulatory variables, 
with few exceptions, are consistent in all five regressions. 
 
[INSERT TABLE 3] 
  
Table 4 reports the estimations for the population in the lower 10% of the income 
distribution (columns 1 and 2) and the lower 20% of the income distribution (columns 3 and 
4). Due to space constraints, Table 4 does not present all different specifications as Table 3; it 
does use the specifications in column 4 of Table 3 as a benchmark (i.e., the one with many 
controls and no multicollinearity problems). Specifications (1) and (3) are estimated using 
FGLS, and (2) and (4) using the OLS Driscoll and Kraay method.  
 
[INSERT TABLE 4] 
 
More stringent capital requirements enter with a negative and significant coefficient 
in all equations estimated with the FGLS method (Table 3, columns 1–4), but seem to be 
insignificant when using the OLS estimator (column 5).8 Given this, we favor the results 
from the FGLS estimator and conclude that more stringent capital requirements lead to lower 
inequality.  
In contrast, capital regulation seems to have an insignificant impact on the percentage 
of individuals in the lower 10% or 20% of the distribution of income (see Table 4). This is 
either because capital regulation diminishes the top incomes or because the regressions in 
Table 4 lose about 50 observations. Unfortunately, we cannot get more insight into the 
former case by examining the impact of capital regulation on the top incomes, because we 
                                                 
8 This has been verified for additional specifications that are not presented here but are available upon request. 
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have a significant number of missing observations. We investigate further to see whether 
outliers drive the results in Table 3.  
The impact of official supervisory power on both income inequality and very low 
incomes (see Tables 3 and 4, respectively) is clearly negative. Because higher supervisory 
power is usually related to more effective supervision of financial-intermediation services, 
this finding is in line with the position that improved screening and monitoring of investment 
projects and more competition in banking markets would drive funds to the best investment 
projects and thus provide equal opportunities to the relatively poor. Hence, besides the 
obvious effect that efficient supervision of banking markets may have in promoting financial 
stability, efficient supervision also seems to have a substantial, real, and positive long-run 
effect in lessening income inequality, allowing equal opportunities in accessing credit, and 
sustaining economic fairness. The question remains whether this result holds irrespective of 
the level of institutional and economic development. 
 In contrast to capital requirements and supervisory power, market discipline and 
activity restrictions seem to exacerbate inequality (see Table 3) and increase the share of 
individuals with very low income (see Table 4, columns 1–2). Intense private monitoring, 
especially policies involving disclosure of risk-management procedures to the public and 
income statement accruals for nonperforming loans, increases the pressure on banks to show 
good short-term results and probably leads them to avoid lending to individuals with less 
collateral (who are more risky).  
Furthermore, market discipline also involves deposit-insurance protection schemes, 
which exist in most developed countries but not in developing ones. In the important 
contribution of Diamond and Dybvig (1983) and other more recent studies (e.g., Cull et al., 
2005), government provision of deposit-insurance schemes can produce superior contracts in 
some circumstances and prevent bank runs and crises. In our context, this implies that 
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deposit-insurance schemes principally protect the poor, who are the people most hurt by 
crises.9 In turn, the positive relationship between activity restrictions and inequality is 
straightforward considering that higher restrictions tend to produce bounded and less 
competitive markets, which tend to reduce the quality of screening and monitoring of 
projects. Under these conditions, it seems very likely that relationship lending or lending to 
well-established firms with high levels of collateral and strong credit history prevails, 
constraining access to credit for the relatively poor.  
Notably, the findings on the impact of the latter two variables on inequality imply 
something that may not have received special attention in the regulatory literature. 
Specifically, on one hand bank regulations may aim, successfully in many circumstances, to 
strengthen the financial system and absorb failures that may lead to crises. On the other hand 
they may have adverse effects on the real economy in the long run. Phrased differently, 
regulatory policies that aim at short-term financial stability probably have an adverse long-
term effect on income equality. An open question remains on whether the prevailing force is 
the positive impact that activity restrictions and market discipline have on inequality and 
poverty or the negative impact that capital regulation and supervisory power have on 
inequality. The next section discusses this issue, as well as whether these findings hold 
irrespective of the level of economic development.  
 
3.2. Bank Regulations and Income Inequality: The Role of Development 
A series of important contributions (see Estache and Wren-Lewis, 2009, and references 
therein) view economic and institutional development as a prerequisite for regulations to 
have a real effect on the economy. In fact, as Bourguignon (2005) states, “Today, it is 
increasingly recognized that, in many circumstances, the problem [in the developing 
                                                 
9 For a review of how financial crises disproportionately hurt the relatively poor, see Baldacci et al. (2002).  
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countries] was that reformers disregarded the functioning of regulatory institutions, assuming 
implicitly they would work as in developed countries.” To account for this complementarity 
in the effect of regulations and initial level of development, we include among the regressors 
the product of our regulatory variables with our proxy for economic development (i.e., the 
GDP per Capita variable).10  
 An important concern in using interaction effects is that the level of the variables and 
the interaction effect may be highly collinear, rendering inference impossible. As the upper 
part of Table 5 shows, this is indeed the case in our sample, with some of the pair-wise 
correlations reaching values above 0.90. An easy way to deal with this issue is through 
“mean-centering” the variables. Mean-centering involves computing the mean of each 
independent variable and then replacing each value with the difference between it and the 
mean. As shown in the lower part of Table 5, the correlation between the products and their 
levels falls now to acceptable values. 
 
[INSERT TABLE 5] 
 
 Estimation results are in Table 6. We first include the interaction of each regulatory 
variable with GDP per Capita (columns 1–4), and then we include all interaction effects 
simultaneously (column 5). Finally, we re-estimate the specification of column 5 with the 
OLS Driscoll and Kraay (1998) method. The results show that the negative impact of capital 
requirements and—most important—supervisory power on inequality weakens substantially 
for those countries with low GDP per Capita. In fact, the specifications with interaction 
terms allow us to examine whether the total effect of regulations can change sign depending 
on the value of GDP per Capita.  
                                                 
10 We also experiment with the product of our regulatory variables with the institutional variables (i.e., 
Bureaucratic quality and Law & order). As shown, these variables are highly correlated with the GDP per 
Capita variable and indeed inference is unaltered. The results are available upon request. 
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 [INSERT TABLE 6] 
 
 Το calculate the value of GDP per Capita at which the impact of Capital 
requirements and Supervisory power turns positive, we set the derivative with respect to the 
two regulatory variables of the estimated equations in Table 6 equal to 0. This yields a GDP 
per Capita equal to approximately $8,622 for the specification in column 1 and $8,413 for 
the specification in column 5 (their average is $8,518). When we take the derivative with 
respect to Supervisory power, the values are $8,140 and $7,918 for the specifications in 
columns 2 and 5, respectively (their average is $8,029). Thus, at least in our sample, reaching 
these rough values of GDP per Capita (as a proxy for economic development) is a 
prerequisite for any negative impact of capital regulation and supervisory power to occur on 
inequality. Markedly, these GDP per Capita values are, as of 2007, close to those of Bulgaria 
and Jamaica. In addition, 65 countries are above the averages of these values and 51 are 
below them. Evidently, for a substantial number of developing countries the Gini coefficient 
will not decrease as a result of more stringent capital requirements or more powerful 
supervisors.  
 In contrast to these findings, the interaction effects of GDP per Capita with Market 
discipline and Activity restrictions are statistically insignificant, suggesting that higher 
market discipline and activity restrictions increase inequality, irrespective of the level of 
development. These results also hold if the two regulatory variables interact with either of the 
two institutional variables (Bureaucratic quality, Law & order), implying that institutional 
development is also irrelevant in this framework.  
 Overall, this analysis highlights that a clear trade-off exists between stricter banking 
regulation and long-term income equality, and although a consensus seems to exist that 
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stricter regulatory policies can promote more stable banking systems, these policies still can 
disproportionately hurt the poor. This finding is in fact in line with Beck et al. (2010), which 
shows that deregulating the banking system in the United States in the 1970s and 1980s led 
to increased incomes, particularly for the poor.  
  
3.3. Bank Regulations and Income Inequality: Other Sensitivity Analyses 
In this section, we use as a benchmark the specifications in column (4) of Table 3, column 
(1) of Table 4, and column (5) of Table 6 to examine the sensitivity of our results with 
respect to (i) the use of three- or 10-year averages of the data (instead of five-year averages), 
(ii) other endogeneity issues, and (iii) the impact of outliers.11  
The results seem robust for the five-year time periods. Here we examine whether 
these results hold for 10- and three-year time intervals, and we report the results in the first 
six columns of Table 7.  
 
[INSERT TABLE 7] 
 
With very few exceptions, the findings are equivalent to those in previous tables. 
When we use three-year averages of the data, some of the results are inferior (e.g., 
coefficients on Supervisory power and Log of population in column 1), which may indicate 
that a three-year period may not be long enough to describe long-term trends in the macro 
variables. When using 10-year averages of the data, the coefficients on Supervisory power 
and the Log of population become statistically significant, as the respective specifications of 
Tables 3, 4, and 6 show. In fact, in the regressions on 10-year averages the coefficient on 
                                                 
11 We have also verified that the rest of the specifications produce similar results. In addition, our main results 
carry through when using pure cross-sectional data (for the year 2008) and associated estimation techniques.    
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inflation becomes positive and statistically significant, which is intuitive because a prolonged 
period of high inflation would widen the income distribution and primarily hurt the poor 
through increased uncertainty and shoe-leather costs.  
As discussed, there is no evidence that causality runs from inequality to bank 
regulations. However, the state of the macroeconomic environment may simultaneously 
determine both elements (see Evans, 1998). For example, when systemic risk rises, the 
resulting bank failures will spread to the real economy, which is likely to affect the income 
distribution. Another issue here is that some of the control variables are also likely to be 
endogenous in the income inequality equations, and this may also bias the estimates on the 
regulatory variables in an unknown direction and magnitude. Moreover, in many situations 
we could be more interested in examining whether changes in regulations yield changes in 
inequality. A dynamic panel estimator can address these issues (see also Beck et al., 2007).12 
We carry out the empirical analysis using a number of alternative dynamic panel data 
models, which yield very similar results. We report the results of the Blundell and Bond 
(1998) method, which extracts additional moment conditions from the differences of the 
variables (for a discussion of the various methods, see Arellano, 2003). All regulatory 
variables, as well as GDP per Capita, Inflation, Trade openness, and Government 
expenditure are treated as endogenous, because reverse causality with inequality may exist 
(see also Beck et al., 2007; Roine et al., 2009). Econometrically, this implies that the 
endogenous variables (say, x) are treated symmetrically with the dependent variable (say, y). 
In this case, the lagged values of xi,t-2 and yi,t-2 and longer lags will be valid instruments.13 
The estimation takes the dependent and independent variables in differences, and this lowers 
the number of observations to 94. 
                                                 
12 The problem here is that we only have two periods in our sample, and all dynamic panel data models will 
somewhat lower the number of observations and thus the explanatory power of our data. Nevertheless, using 
this method is required to see whether dynamics and endogeneity issues prevail. 
13 For a thorough discussion of how lags can be properly used as instrumental variables under the Blundell and 
Bond (1998) method, see Bond (2002). 
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For the dependent variables (Gini coefficient and the percentage of individuals in the 
lower decile of the distribution of income) and all endogenous variables except Bank 
regulations, lags are available for t-2 and t-3. For bank regulations we experiment with two 
additional instruments. First, we use the legal origin of the countries in our sample (data are 
from La Porta et al., 2008). Several papers have shown that differences in legal origins are 
significantly related to financial sector developments, perhaps because different legal 
traditions emphasize different levels of the rights of property owners or because some 
systems are more adaptable to exogenous changes than others (see Clarke et al., 2002 and 
references therein).  
Second, we use a measure of citizen distrust toward government. Aghion et al. (2009) 
show that general forms of government regulation are strongly correlated with trust, a 
relationship that probably stems from the fact that distrust creates public demand for 
regulation. Unfortunately, data from the World Values Survey on the trust variable in Aghion 
et al. (2009) does not cover some countries in our sample, which further lowers the number 
of observations to 89. Therefore, we report the regressions with the legal origins variable (the 
rest are available on request).  
The results are in the last three columns of Table 7. The Sargan test shows no 
evidence of overidentifying restrictions. Even though the equations indicate that first-order 
(AR1) autocorrelation is present, this does not imply that the estimates are inconsistent. 
Inconsistency would be implied if second-order autocorrelation was present, but the test for 
AR2 errors (see last lines of Table 7) rejects this case. One difference in the results compared 
to those of Table 3 is that in column (7) the coefficient on Capital requirements is 
statistically significant only at the 10% level, which verifies that Capital requirements is 
probably the weaker determinant of inequality among our regulatory variables. This is also 
corroborated from the insignificant coefficient of Capital requirements in column (9). In the 
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GMM regression with distributional effects (column 8), much like with the regressions in 
Table 6, the negative effect of Capital requirements and of Supervisory power on inequality 
fades away for less developed countries. The rest of the results are also in line with the 
previous results. Therefore, we may conclude that endogeneity issues do not substantially 
affect the original findings on the regulations-inequality nexus. 
As mentioned, a final potential drawback to the empirical analysis may be that 
outliers drive results (i.e., the inclusion of particular countries). To determine whether our 
results are sensitive to outliers, we perform a jackknife analysis (Efron and Tibshirani, 1993). 
This method involves estimating the initial equation by excluding in each replication one or 
more cross-sectional units (countries).  
Table 8 reports the coefficients, as well as the associated t-statistics, when excluding 
the maximum and minimum estimated values of these coefficients. Once again, the first 
regression corresponds to regression (4) of Table 3, the second to regression (1) of Table 4, 
and the third to regression (5) of Table 6. If outliers do not have a significant impact on the 
regression equations, then the coefficients obtained from excluding both the minimum and 
the maximum values must retain their signs and statistical significance according to the 
respective regressions in Tables 3, 4, and 6. Comparing these coefficients with their 
equivalent ones, we conclude that our results are robust to the exclusion of particular 
observations that yield extreme estimates and hence that outliers do not substantially affect 
the main implications of the paper.  
  
[INSERT TABLE 8] 
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4. Conclusions and Policy Considerations 
 Even though economists disagree on whether the distribution of income has widened 
or narrowed over the last decades, many assert that economic policy has an impact on it. This 
study links, for the first time, the full array of banking regulations with income inequality, 
and the findings suggest that banking regulations are quite significant in explaining 
inequality. In particular, higher supervisory power and to a lesser degree more stringent 
capital requirements decrease the Gini coefficient. In contrast, stricter market discipline and 
activity restrictions raise both inequality and the share of individuals in the lower deciles of 
the distribution of income. Note, however, that the positive effect of higher capital 
requirements and supervisory power on equality fades away for less developed countries, but 
the corresponding negative effect of stricter market discipline and activity restrictions holds 
irrespective of the level of development. 
  Bank regulations and associated reforms aim at enhancing the creditworthiness of 
banks and at improving the stability of the financial sector. Several studies over the last 
decade show that regulations do matter in shaping bank risk (e.g., Laeven and Levine, 2009; 
Agoraki et al., 2009) or in affecting bank efficiency in particular (Barth et al., 2010) and the 
probability of banking crises in general (e.g., Barth et al., 2008). Yet, what if bank 
regulations have other real effects on the economy besides those associated with banking 
stability? And, more important, what if these real effects counteract the intended stabilizing 
effects?  
 Two issues should be considered in answering these questions. First, the literature on 
the relationship between bank regulations and financial stability is inconclusive. In fact, 
different types of regulation may have opposing effects on financial stability, according to 
the existing research. Second, even if we assume that bank regulations like more stringent 
market discipline requirements lower banks' risk-taking appetite and enhance stability (Barth 
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et al., 2008), the empirical findings here suggest that stricter market discipline and activity 
restrictions have some negative association with the earnings of the relatively lower income 
population. That is, banks pass the increased cost of higher transparency (i.e., higher market 
discipline) and their lower ability to diversify (i.e., stricter activity restrictions) on to the 
relatively lower-income population that lacks good credit and collateral. In other words a 
tradeoff between banking stability and inequality may be present. Given the contemporary 
discussion surrounding (i) the rebirth of Glass-Steagall-type regulatory reforms and (ii) the 
need to increase the level of private monitoring and discipline in banking markets, there may 
be more to think about before taking those steps.  
 We certainly do not suggest that improving transparency in banking markets or 
raising activity restrictions is bound to affect the economic system adversely. More research 
is necessary to reach this conclusion, and at least five more years of data are needed so that 
empirical analysts can have a broader picture of the recent financial crisis and richer data sets 
that encompass its consequences.  
 However, three clear suggestions emerge from this paper and are also consistent with 
the findings of Beck et al. (2010). First, the liberalization of banking markets, primarily 
through abolition of activity restrictions, helps the poor get easier access to credit. This in 
turn allows them to escape the poverty trap and substantially raise their incomes. Second, 
appropriate regulation should provide less costly incentives to banks and firms to increase 
market discipline without hurting the relatively poor. Information technologies that would 
lower the cost of transparency and more effective onsite supervision that would enhance the 
trust in the banking system may help achieve this goal. Finally, economies first need strong 
and independent institutions to see any positive effect of capital regulation and supervisory 
power on equality. Though deregulation had a negative impact on inequality in the United 
States, this may not be true for countries with weak institutions in which the socioeconomic 
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 Clearly, more research is needed on this issue. An interesting extension of this paper 
concerns the potential impact of bank regulations on macroeconomic convergence (Evans 
and Karras, 1996) or the speed of convergence (Evans, 1997). In addition, the interplay 
between regulations and their actual implementation may have more to say about credit 
availability and income inequality. Finally, more detailed datasets from both developed and 
developing countries could highlight the channels that may affect the bank regulations-
income inequality nexus. We leave these ideas for future research.  
elites directly affect the decisions and policies of supervisors. Clearly, these economies need 
to take further steps to enhance central bank independence, create higher transparency among 
regulators, and monitor the level of capital requirements more closely. 
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Appendix - Information on Regulatory Variables 
 
Variable Description 
Capital 
requirements 
This variable is determined by adding 1 if the answer is yes to questions 1-6 and 0 otherwise, and the opposite occurs for questions 7 and 8 (i.e., yes=0, 
no=1). The questions are: (1) Is the minimum required capital asset ratio (risk-weighted) in line with Basel guidelines? (2) Does the ratio vary with 
market risk? (3-5) Before determining minimum capital adequacy, are any of the following are deducted from the book value of capital? (a) market value 
of loan losses not realized on the financial statements (b) unrealized losses on securities portfolios (c) unrealized foreign exchange losses. (6) Have 
regulatory/supervisory authorities verified the sources of funds to be used as capital? (7) Can assets other than cash or government securities provide the 
initial or subsequent injections of capital? (8) Can borrowed funds provide the initial disbursement of capital?  
Supervisory 
power 
This variable is determined by adding 1 if the answer is yes and 0 otherwise, for each of the following 14 questions: (1) Does the supervisory agency 
have the right to meet with external auditors to discuss their report without the approval of the bank? (2) Are auditors legally required to communicate 
directly to the supervisory agency any presumed involvement of bank directors or senior managers in illicit activities, fraud, or insider abuse? (3) Can 
supervisors take legal action against external auditors for negligence? (4) Can the supervisory authorities force a bank to change its internal 
organizational structure? (5) Does the institution disclose off-balance-sheet items to supervisors? (6) Can the supervisory agency order the bank's 
directors or management to constitute provisions to cover actual or potential losses? (7) Can the supervisory agency suspend directors' decisions to 
distribute dividends? (8) Can the supervisory agency suspend directors' decisions to distribute bonuses? (9) Can the supervisory agency suspend directors' 
decisions to distribute management fees? (10) Can the supervisory agency supersede bank shareholder rights and declare the bank insolvent? (11) Does 
banking law allow a supervisory agency or any other government agency (other than a court) to suspend some or all ownership rights at a problem bank? 
(12) Regarding bank restructuring and reorganization, can the supervisory agency or any other government agency (other than a court) supersede 
shareholder rights? (13) Regarding bank restructuring and reorganization, can the supervisory agency or any other government agency (other than a 
court) remove and replace management? (14) Regarding bank restructuring and reorganization, can the supervisory agency or any other government 
agency (other than a court) remove and replace directors? 
Market 
discipline 
This variable is determined by adding 1 if the answer is yes to questions 1-7 and 0 otherwise, and the opposite occurs for questions 8 and 9 (i.e., yes=0, 
no=1). (1) Is subordinated debt allowed (or required) capital? (2) Are financial institutions required to produce consolidated accounts covering all bank 
and any nonbank financial subsidiaries? (3) Are off-balance-sheet items disclosed to the public? (4) Must banks disclose their risk-management 
procedures? (5) Are directors legally liable for erroneous/misleading information? (6) Do regulations require credit ratings for commercial banks? (7) Is 
an external audit by certified/licensed auditor mandatory for banks? (8) Does accrued, unpaid interest/principal on nonperforming loans appear on the 
income statement? (9) Is there an explicit deposit-insurance protection system? 
Activity 
restrictions 
The score for this variable is determined on the basis of the level of regulatory restrictiveness for bank participation in: (1) securities activities, (2) 
insurance activities, (3) real estate activities, and (4) bank ownership of nonfinancial firms. These activities can be unrestricted, permitted, restricted, or 
prohibited and receive values of 1, 2, 3, or 4, respectively. We create an overall index by calculating the average value of the four categories.  
Note: The individual questions and answers are from the World Bank database developed by Barth, et al. (2001, 2006, 2008). 
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Table 1 
 
Summary Statistics 
 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. dev. Min. Max. 
Gini coefficient 218 39.62 10.24 22.18 62.50 
Lower 10% 123 31.96 7.99 18.97 49.02 
Lower 20% 84 47.93 9.56 33.34 63.63 
Capital requirements 232 5.08 1.48 1.60 8.00 
Supervisory power 232 11.08 2.14 5.00 14.00 
Market discipline 228 6.36 1.03 3.00 9.00 
Activity restrictions 230 2.56 0.58 1.00 4.00 
Log of population 398 16.00 1.75 11.23 20.99 
GDP per capita 399 10744.09 11296.18 154.22 73568.63 
Inflation 233 29.03 347.23 -2.83 5304.78 
Trade openness 393 83.78 52.15 1.91 434.39 
Government expenditure 393 17.11 7.98 3.79 69.49 
Bureaucratic quality 340 2.30 1.12 0.00 4.00 
Law & order 340 4.02 1.32 0.93 6.00 
Bank liquidity 389 0.89 0.41 0.11 3.03 
Mobility of funds 385 1.69 18.55 0.00 303.59 
The table reports the number of observations and summary statistics (mean, standard 
deviation, minimum, and maximum) for the variables in the empirical analysis. Gini 
coefficient is the measure of inequality obtained from the Lorenz curve. Lower 10% and 
Lower 20% are the percentages of population included in the lower 10% and 20% of the 
income distribution. Capital requirements, Supervisory power, Market discipline, and 
Activity restrictions are the regulatory indices from Barth et al. (2001, 2006, 2008). Trade 
openness is the sum of exports and imports as a share of GDP. Government expenditure is 
the ratio of central government expenditure as a share of GDP. Bureaucratic quality and 
Law & order are the institutional-quality indicators from the International Country Risk 
Guide. Bank liquidity is defined as the ratio of bank deposits to bank credit, and Mobility 
of funds is the ratio of offshore bank deposits to domestic bank deposits. 
 
Table 2 
Correlation Matrix 
 
 
Initial 
Gini 
Capital 
requir. 
Superv. 
power 
Market 
discipl. 
Activity 
restrict. 
Log of 
popul. 
GDP per 
cap. Inflation 
Trade 
open. 
Gov. 
expend. 
Bur. 
quality 
Law & 
order 
Dep. on 
banks 
Mob. of 
funds 
Initial Gini 1.000              
Capital requirements 0.066 1.000             
Supervisory power 0.172 0.149 1.000            
Market discipline 0.110 -0.005 0.060 1.000           
Activity restrictions 0.363 0.094 0.219 -0.030 1.000          
Log of population 0.064 0.000 0.108 -0.037 0.054 1.000         
GDP per capita -0.463 0.011 -0.233 0.063 -0.465 -0.222 1.000        
Inflation 0.210 0.052 0.008 -0.154 0.220 0.007 -0.340 1.000       
Trade openness -0.056 0.003 0.054 0.091 -0.197 -0.440 0.404 -0.146 1.000      
Government expenditure -0.029 0.085 -0.027 -0.235 0.138 0.057 -0.397 0.151 -0.232 1.000     
Bureaucratic quality -0.424 0.059 -0.202 0.093 -0.411 -0.127 0.797 -0.371 0.256 -0.359 1.000    
Law & order -0.582 -0.014 -0.220 0.020 -0.384 -0.207 0.685 -0.305 0.235 -0.146 0.543 1.000   
Bank liquidity -0.202 0.034 -0.318 0.126 -0.176 -0.154 0.406 -0.215 -0.043 -0.060 0.404 0.399 1.000  
Mobility of funds 0.289 -0.053 0.077 0.045 0.069 -0.240 -0.085 0.104 0.136 -0.054 -0.148 -0.169 -0.053 1.000 
The table reports the correlation coefficients between the explanatory variables in the empirical analysis. Capital requirements, Supervisory power, Market discipline, and Activity 
restrictions are the regulatory indices from Barth et al. (2001, 2006, 2008). Trade openness is the sum of exports and imports as a share of GDP. Government expenditure is the ratio of 
central government expenditure as a share of GDP. Bureaucratic quality and Law & order are the institutional-quality indicators from the International Country Risk Guide. Bank liquidity is 
the ratio of bank deposits to bank credit, and Mobility of funds is the ratio of offshore bank deposits to domestic bank deposits. 
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Table 3 
Bank Regulations and Income Inequality: Gini Coefficient Regressions 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
0.813*** 0.811*** 0.786*** 0.800*** 0.756*** Initial Gini (54.97) (55.39) (65.59) (47.71) (39.95) 
-0.133*** -0.142*** -0.126* -0.167*** -0.139 Capital requirements (-2.73) (-2.81) (-1.69) (-3.38) (-1.23) 
-0.127*** -0.177*** -0.189*** -0.190*** -0.133*** Supervisory power (-2.70) (-3.30) (-3.31) (-3.41) (-5.47) 
0.268*** 0.234** 0.548*** 0.231** 0.215** Market discipline (2.78) (2.35) (5.58) (2.57) (2.28) 
0.901*** 0.977*** 0.839*** 0.969*** 0.838*** Activity restrictions (5.49) (5.35) (3.79) (5.38) (8.25) 
0.267*** 0.215*** 0.156* 0.256*** 0.390*** Log of population (3.77) (3.08) (1.75) (3.67) (3.41) 
-0.000*** -0.000*** 0.000 -0.000*** -0.000*** GDP per capita (-5.12) (-4.78) (0.17) (-4.91) (-2.99) 
0.033** 0.028* 0.009 0.020 0.031* Inflation (2.04) (1.81) (0.38) (1.29) (1.82) 
-0.241 -0.088 -0.222 -0.025 -0.129 Time effect (-1.24) (-0.40) (-1.15) (-0.12) (-1.60) 
 -0.005** -0.002 -0.005** -0.003** Trade openness  (-2.32) (-0.74) (-2.22) (-2.25) 
 -0.021 -0.024 -0.020 -0.012 Government expenditure  (-1.44) (-1.45) (-1.33) (-0.52) 
  -0.966***   Bureaucratic quality   (-4.44)   
  -0.471***   Law & order   (-3.87)   
   0.186 -0.317 Bank liquidity    (0.63) (-0.64) 
   1.041*** 1.628*** Mobility of funds    (2.61) (11.29) 
2.186 4.435** 8.507*** 4.371** 3.747*** Constant term (1.32) (2.26) (3.24) (2.53) (4.97) 
Observations 156 156 148 156 156 
Wald test 12728.82 12127.74 14406.71 25443.33  
P-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000  
R-square     0.853 
The table reports coefficient estimates and t-statistics (in parentheses). The dependent variable is the Gini coefficient. 
Regressions (1)-(4) are estimated by feasible generalized least squares (FGLS) with heteroskedastic errors and 
regression (5) with the fixed-effects Driscoll and Kraay (1998) method. Initial Gini is the Gini coefficient in the year 
before our sample period begins. Capital requirements, Supervisory power, Market discipline, and Activity restrictions 
are the regulatory indices from Barth et al. (2001, 2006, 2008). Trade openness is the sum of exports and imports as a 
share of GDP. Government expenditure is the ratio of central government expenditure as a share of GDP. Bureaucratic 
quality and Law & order are the institutional-quality indicators from the International Country Risk Guide. Bank 
liquidity is the ratio of bank deposits to bank credit, and Mobility of funds as the ratio of offshore bank deposits to 
domestic bank deposits. The Wald’s test and its associated p-value show the goodness of fit of the FGLS regressions 
and the R-square the goodness of fit of the fixed-effects regression. The ***, **, and * marks denote statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10 % level, respectively.  
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 Table 4 
Bank Regulations and Income Inequality: Top and Lower Decile Regressions 
 
 Lower 10% Lower 20%  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
0.606*** 0.576*** 0.605*** 0.550*** Initial Gini 
(31.75) (68.02) (30.84) (63.60) 
0.038 -0.047 0.15 0.092 Capital requirements 
(0.50) (-0.40) (1.15) (1.61) 
-0.173*** -0.078*** -0.023 0.018 Supervisory power 
(-3.46) (-2.83) (-0.44) (0.36) 
0.368*** 0.370*** 0.086 -0.059 Market discipline 
(3.60) (4.38) (0.70) (-0.16) 
1.113*** 1.143*** 0.763*** 0.782* Activity restrictions 
(4.60) (5.00) (3.37) (1.94) 
0.273*** 0.379*** 0.097 0.036 Log of population 
(3.03) (4.56) (1.14) (0.24) 
-0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** GDP per capita 
(-3.66) (-2.94) (-6.14) (-11.86) 
-0.029** -0.010** -0.009 -0.019** Inflation 
(-1.99) (-2.08) (-0.48) (-2.11) 
-0.005 -0.000 -0.004 -0.013* Trade openness 
(-1.37) (-0.14) (-0.93) (-1.68) 
-0.017 -0.027* -0.177*** -0.248*** Government expenditure 
(-0.99) (-1.75) (-4.87) (-7.33) 
0.424** 0.616*** 0.210 0.034 Bank liquidity 
(2.33) (3.32) (0.66) (0.21) 
0.417* 0.641*** 0.658** 0.893*** Mobility of funds 
(1.81) (2.84) (2.60) (3.20) 
-0.526** -0.167*** 0.251 0.608 Time effect 
(-1.98) (-4.43) (0.94) (1.66) 
0.409 -1.198 23.799*** 30.370*** Constant term 
(0.17) (-1.24) (8.57) (6.69) 
Observations 109 109 75 75 
Wald test 50022.51  25677.34  
P-value 0.000  0.000  
R-square  0.837  0.894 
The table reports coefficient estimates and t-statistics (in parentheses). The dependent variable in regressions (1) 
and (2) is the share of the population in the lower 10% of the income distribution; in regressions (3) and (4) the 
dependent variable is the share of the population in the lower 20% of the income distribution. Regressions (1) and 
(3) are estimated using the feasible generalized least squares (FGLS) method with heteroskedastic errors, and 
regressions (2) and (4) use the fixed-effects Driscoll and Kraay (1998) method. Initial Gini is the Gini coefficient in 
the year before our sample period begins. Capital requirements, Supervisory power, Market discipline, and Activity 
restrictions are the regulatory indices from Barth et al. (2001, 2006, 2008). Trade openness is the sum of exports 
and imports as a share of GDP. Government expenditure is the ratio of central government expenditure as a share of 
GDP. Bank liquidity is the ratio of bank deposits to bank credit, and Mobility of funds is the ratio of offshore bank 
deposits to domestic bank deposits. The Wald’s test and its associated p-value show the goodness of fit of the 
FGLS regressions, and the R-square shows the goodness of fit of the fixed-effects regression. The ***, **, and * 
marks denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10 % level, respectively.  
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Table 5  
Correlations of Variables before and after Mean-Centering 
 
Before mean-centering (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (1)*(2) (1)*(3) (1)*(4) (1)*(5) 
GDP per capita (1) 1.000         
Capital requirements (2) 0.048 1.000        
Supervisory power (3) -0.167 0.150 1.000       
Market discipline (4) 0.167 0.082 0.092 1.000      
Activity restrictions (5) -0.442 0.057 0.158 -0.030 1.000     
(1)*(2) 0.933 0.303 -0.088 0.183 -0.390 1.000    
(1)*(3) 0.963 0.093 0.043 0.205 -0.395 0.927 1.000   
(1)*(4) 0.977 0.063 -0.124 0.306 -0.424 0.918 0.957 1.000  
(1)*(5) 0.939 0.063 -0.133 0.169 -0.205 0.891 0.917 0.912 1.000 
 
After mean-centering (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (1)*(2) (1)*(3) (1)*(4) (1)*(5) 
GDP per capita (1) 1.000         
Capital requirements (2) 0.048 1.000        
Supervisory power (3) -0.167 0.150 1.000       
Market discipline (4) 0.167 0.082 0.092 1.000      
Activity restrictions (5) -0.442 0.057 0.158 -0.030 1.000     
(1)*(2) 0.111 0.158 0.112 0.064 -0.028 1.000    
(1)*(3) -0.089 0.118 0.262 0.125 0.135 0.258 1.000   
(1)*(4) 0.235 0.057 0.108 0.167 -0.085 0.042 0.201 1.000  
(1)*(5) -0.546 -0.024 0.105 -0.082 0.327 0.070 0.147 -0.282 1.000 
The table reports the correlation coefficients between GDP per Capita, the four bank-regulation indices, and the product of 
GDP per Capita and each and every one of the regulation indices. The upper part of the table reports the correlation 
coefficients of the original data set, and the lower part of the table after mean-centering has been applied. 
 36
 37
 
Table 6 
Bank Regulations and Income Inequality: Distributional Effects Due to Economic Development 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
0.804*** 0.770*** 0.797*** 0.802*** 0.774*** 0.748*** Initial Gini (48.47) (57.15) (45.69) (44.29) (53.45) (40.60) 
-0.243*** -0.0949** -0.179*** -0.163*** -0.122** -0.176 Capital requirements (-3.76) (-2.22) (-3.59) (-3.26) (-2.08) (-1.35) 
-0.151*** -0.302*** -0.202*** -0.187*** -0.289*** -0.214*** Supervisory power (-2.73) (-5.83) (-3.57) (-3.28) (-5.45) (-16.89) 
0.296*** 0.219*** 0.341*** 0.231** 0.214** 0.176** Market discipline (2.64) (2.74) (2.83) (2.52) (2.52) (2.07) 
0.933*** 1.025*** 1.106*** 0.937*** 0.991*** 0.776*** Activity restrictions (4.45) (7.19) (5.80) (4.70) (5.65) (13.46) 
0.265*** 0.479*** 0.284*** 0.253*** 0.491*** 0.469*** Log of population (3.30) (7.89) (3.41) (3.54) (6.26) (3.58) 
-0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** GDP per capita (-4.17) (-8.18) (-4.43) (-4.32) (-6.55) (-3.32) 
0.030* 0.011 0.020 0.020 0.012 0.028 Inflation (1.87) (0.90) (1.23) (1.34) (0.87) (1.48) 
-0.007** -0.007*** -0.004 -0.006** -0.007** -0.004*** Trade openness (-2.42) (-3.42) (-1.14) (-2.23) (-2.48) (-15.45) 
-0.002 -0.029*** -0.015 -0.019 -0.028** -0.019 Government expenditure (-0.16) (-2.59) (-1.06) (-1.26) (-2.27) (-0.72) 
0.024 0.920*** 0.135 0.220 0.882*** 0.413 Bank liquidity (0.09) (3.22) (0.42) (0.70) (2.66) (0.69) 
1.093*** 1.400*** 0.961** 1.053*** 1.488*** 1.645*** Mobility of funds (2.62) (4.05) (2.34) (2.61) (4.08) (16.12) 
-0.027 0.065 -0.139 -0.029 0.258 0.120*** Time effect (-0.12) (0.36) (-0.62) (-0.13) (1.32) (3.75) 
0.000*    0.000** 0.000* GDP per capita * Capital 
requirements (1.80)    (2.32) (1.84) 
 0.000***   0.000*** 0.000*** GDP per capita * 
Supervisory power  (7.67)   (7.02) (13.28) 
  0.000  0.000 0.000 GDP per capita * Market 
discipline   (0.51)  (1.37) (1.41) 
   0.000 -0.000 -0.000 GDP per capita * Activity 
restrictions    (0.37) (-0.38) (-0.28) 
4.087*** 1.675 3.987*** 4.407*** 1.231 2.505* Constant term (2.87) (1.47) (2.58) (3.55) (0.82) (1.81) 
Observations 156 156 156 156 156 156 
Wald test 9915.51 23337.44 11291.91 20084.7 23303.89  
P-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000  
R squared      0.8585 
The table reports coefficient estimates and t-statistics (in parentheses). The dependent variable is the Gini coefficient. 
Regressions (1)-(5) are estimated using the feasible generalized least squares (FGLS) method with heteroskedastic errors, 
and regression (6) uses the fixed-effects Driscoll and Kraay (1998) method. Initial Gini is the Gini coefficient in the year 
before our sample period begins. Capital requirements, Supervisory power, Market discipline, and Activity restrictions 
are the regulatory indices from Barth et al. (2001, 2006, 2008). Trade openness is the sum of exports and imports as a 
share of GDP. Government expenditure is the ratio of central government expenditure as a share of GDP. Bank liquidity 
is the ratio of bank deposits to bank credit, and Mobility of funds is the ratio of offshore bank deposits to domestic bank 
deposits. The Wald’s test and its associated p-value show the goodness of fit of the FGLS regressions, and the R-square 
shows the goodness of fit of the fixed-effects regression. The ***, **, and * marks denote statistical significance at the 
1%, 5%, and 10 % level, respectively.  
 
 
Table 7 
Other Sensitivity Analysis 
 
 3-year averages 10-year averages GMM regressions   
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
 Gini  Gini Lower 10% Gini Gini Lower 10% Gini Gini Lower 10% 
0.799*** 0.792*** 0.615*** 0.741*** 0.744*** 0.560*** 0.541*** 0.555*** 0.488*** Initial Gini or first lag of 
Gini (43.57) (42.13) (31.81) (112.64) (68.72) (46.13) (18.74) (20.17) (27.12) 
-0.201*** -0.175** 0.069 -0.104** -0.136** 0.081 -0.131* -0.127** 0.051 
Capital requirements 
(-3.31) (-2.25) (0.80) (-2.36) (-2.15) (1.34) (-1.76) (-2.31) (0.70) 
-0.065 -0.188*** -0.184*** -0.206*** -0.189*** -0.252*** -0.188*** -0.275*** -0.155*** 
Supervisory power 
(-0.96) (-2.70) (-3.54) (-10.42) (-4.23) (-6.56) (-3.14) (-5.01) (-2.80) 
0.341*** 0.285** 0.366*** 0.515*** 0.454*** 0.335*** 0.327*** 0.232*** 0.348*** 
Market discipline 
(2.64) (2.29) (3.83) (6.96) (3.74) (3.95) (3.44) (2.67) (3.14) 
1.156*** 1.083*** 1.181*** 0.998*** 1.047*** 1.350*** 0.881*** 0.876*** 1.007*** 
Activity restrictions 
(5.48) (5.83) (4.42) (12.92) (6.14) (5.63) (4.01) (4.44) (4.07) 
0.165 0.276*** 0.225** 0.349*** 0.380*** 0.177*** 0.233*** 0.387*** 0.281*** 
Log of population 
(1.62) (3.15) (2.32) (11.49) (6.56) (3.44) (2.92) (4.07) (3.10) 
-0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000 -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** 
GDP per capita 
(-4.17) (-4.49) (-1.42) (-12.12) (-6.06) (-5.72) (-4.10) (-4.61) (-4.01) 
0.007 -0.011 -0.016 0.148*** 0.149*** 0.110 0.006 0.022 -0.010 
Inflation 
(0.35) (-0.46) (-1.37) (22.10) (10.42) (5.95) (0.84) (1.04) (-1.02) 
      -0.035 0.233 -0.303 
Time effect 
      (-0.09) (1.20) (-1.61) 
-0.327 -0.592* 0.011       
Time effect (2001) 
(-0.93) (-1.81) (0.02)       
-0.712** -0.872*** -0.143       
Time effect (2004) 
(-2.14) (-2.99) (-0.27)       
-0.006* -0.010*** 0.000 0.003 -0.002 0.004 -0.007** -0.006** -0.018** 
Trade openness 
(-1.85) (-3.30) (0.25) (1.52) (-0.73) (1.34) (-2.42) (-2.17) (-2.41) 
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-0.008 0.012 0.006 0.002 0.013 -0.05*** -0.031 -0.017* -0.025 
Government expenditure 
(-0.41) (0.62) (0.39) (0.17) (0.80) (-5.05) (-1.49) (-1.83) (-0.99) 
-0.115 0.502 -0.415 -0.246* -0.258* 0.125 0.017 0.843** 0.610*** 
Bank liquidity 
(-0.32) (1.42) (-1.22) (1.76) (-1.79) (0.33) (0.03) (2.49) (2.81) 
1.348*** 1.558*** 0.465* 1.499*** 1.137*** 0.701*** 1.182*** 1.397*** 0.501** 
Mobility of funds 
(2.74) (3.06) (1.94) (4.72) (3.05) (3.17) (3.09) (3.79) (1.97) 
 0.000***   0.000***   0.000**  GDP per capita * Capital 
requirements  (3.17)   (2.76)   (2.40)  
 0.000***   0.000***   0.000***  GDP per capita * 
Supervisory power  (5.10)   (7.67)   (6.80)  
 -0.000   -0.000   0.000  GDP per capita * Market 
discipline  (-0.95)   (-0.52)   (0.91)  
 -0.000   -0.000   -0.000  GDP per capita * Activity 
restrictions  (-0.87)   (-0.83)   (-0.09)  
4.113 4.269* 0.272 1.249 -0.0135 4.188** 1.584 1.677 0.537 
Constant term 
(1.37) (1.65) (0.10) (1.37) (-0.01) (2.21) (0.98) (1.52) (0.60) 
Observations 195 195 124 94 94 77 94 94 77 
Wald test (p-value) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Sargan test (p-value)       0.203 0.288 0.191 
AR1 test (p-value)       0.122 0.132 0.290 
AR2 test (p-value)       0.022 0.034 0.029 
The table reports coefficient estimates and t-statistics (in parentheses). The dependent variable of each equation is in the top of the table. The first six regressions are estimated using 
the feasible generalized least squares (FGLS) with heteroskedastic errors. The last three regressions are estimated on the basis of five-year averages using the Blundell and Bond (1998) 
method for dynamic panels. Initial Gini or first lag of Gini is the Gini coefficient in the year before our sample period begins (for the first six regressions) or the first lag of Gini for the 
GMM regressions (last three regressions). Capital requirements, Supervisory power, Market discipline, and Activity restrictions are the regulatory indices from Barth et al. (2001, 2006, 
2008). Trade openness is the sum of exports and imports as a share of GDP. Government expenditure is the ratio of central government expenditure as a share of GDP. Bank liquidity is 
defined as the ratio of bank deposits to bank credit and mobility of funds as the ratio of offshore bank deposits to domestic bank deposits. The Wald test and its associated p-value show 
the goodness of fit of the FGLS regressions. Sargan is the test for overidentifying restrictions for the dynamic panel method, and AR1 and AR2 are the tests for first- and second-order 
autocorrelation in the disturbances (second-order autocorrelation should not be present). The ***, **, and * marks denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10 % level, 
respectively. 
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Table 8 
Outlier Analysis 
 
 Min. coefficient t-statistic Max. coefficient t-statistic 
 Outlier analysis for regression (4) of Table 3 
Initial Gini 0.762*** 53.26 0.820*** 47.18 
Capital requirements -0.238*** -4.63 -0.064 -1.22 
Supervisory power -0.262*** -5.58 -0.102** -2.14 
Market discipline 0.167** 1.98** 0.530*** 5.64 
Activity restrictions 0.552** 2.57 1.327*** 9.85 
Log of population 0.128** 2.05 0.473*** 5.66 
GDP per capita -0.000*** -7.04 -0.000*** -3.85 
Inflation -0.017 -1.07 0.037** 2.23 
Trade openness -0.010*** -4.35 -0.001 -0.39 
Government expenditure -0.045*** -4.04 0.023 1.36 
Bank liquidity -0.272 -0.85 0.799*** 2.75 
Mobility of funds 0.777** 2.10 4.541*** 9.30 
Time effect -0.529*** -2.93 0.236 1.00 
 Outlier analysis for regression (1) of Table 4 
Initial Gini 0.587*** 31.41 0.642*** 37.11 
Capital requirements -0.114 -1.59 0.152 2.33 
Supervisory power -0.216*** -4.62 -0.121** -2.26 
Market discipline 0.285*** 3.21 0.596*** 6.59 
Activity restrictions 0.813*** 3.29 1.538*** 6.47 
Log of population 0.163** 1.97 0.430*** 4.67 
GDP per capita -0.000**** -3.47 -0.000 -0.99 
Inflation -0.037** -2.27 -0.015 -0.89 
Trade openness -0.002 -0.60 0.009*** 2.68 
Government expenditure -0.032 -1.53 0.016 1.36 
Bank liquidity -0.653** -1.96 0.215 0.50 
Mobility of funds 0.178* 1.91 0.974*** 4.02 
Time effect -0.940*** -4.31 -0.278 -0.94 
 Outlier analysis for regression (5) of Table 6 
Initial Gini 0.761*** 56.71 0.795*** 45.01 
Capital requirements -0.247*** -3.49 -0.039 -0.66 
Supervisory power -0.351*** -8.12 -0.175*** -2.72 
Market discipline 0.175 2.08** 0.555*** 7.02 
Activity restrictions 0.608*** 2.64 1.373*** 7.98 
Log of population 0.220** 2.46 0.592*** 8.02 
GDP per capita -0.000*** -6.70 -0.000*** -4.75 
Inflation -0.003 -0.12 0.031* 1.66 
Trade openness -0.010*** -3.32 -0.002 -0.78 
Government expenditure -0.047*** -3.92 0.017 1.19 
Bank liquidity 0.263 0.77 1.472*** 6.04 
Mobility of funds 1.107*** 2.90 3.356*** 5.43 
Time effect -0.131 -0.67 0.360* 1.88 
GDP per capita*Capital requirements 0.000* 1.68 0.000*** 3.75 
GDP per capita* Supervisory power 0.000*** 4.88 0.000*** 10.29 
GDP per capita*Market discipline -0.000 -0.97 0.000*** 4.34 
GDP per capita*Activity restrictions -0.000* -1.70 0.000 0.59 
The table presents outlier analysis for the main specifications of the empirical analysis. The first part corresponds to 
regression (4) of Table 3, the second to regression (1) of Table 4, and the third to regression (5) of Table 6. The minimum 
and maximum coefficients and the associated t-statistics are presented. If outliers do not have a significant impact on the 
regression equations, then both minimum and maximum coefficients must retain the sign and statistical significance 
according to the respective regressions in Tables 3, 4, and 6.        
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